Obama, the Iran Nuclear Deal & President Trump

The 20 Percent Solution

If Iran decides to produce weapons-grade uranium from 20 percent enriched uranium, it has already technically undertaken 90 percent of the enrichment effort required.

Using 20 percent enriched uranium as a feed, 250 kg UF6 can be turned to weapons-grade material in a month’s time.

Iran began 20 percent enriched uranium production in early 2010.

By late 2012 Iran had produced enough 20 percent enriched uranium to produce weapons grade uranium in roughly one month.

In other words, Iran already had weapons grade uranium capability in 2012.

Iran’s problem was lack of a delivery system – a medium or long-range ballistic missile.

Iran’s 2012 ballistic missile capability was outlined in a December 6, 2012 Congressional Report, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs:

Iran must rely on others for certain key missile components and materials in its MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] program. Export controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult, but certainly not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such items.

It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capability by 2015 for several reasons:

• Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary.
• Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions.
• Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.

Sanctions had severely impaired Iran’s ballistic missile program – to the point that medium-range ballistic missile production was severely limited.

ICBM’s were simply not attainable.

In late 2012 Iran found itself in the following situation:

1. Iran had achieved 20 percent-enriched uranium production. Stockpiles were now sufficient to produce weapons-grade uranium.
2. Iran was facing intense International pressure regarding its nuclear ambitions.
3. The Iranian economy was on the verge of collapse.
4. Iran’s ballistic missile technology – the nuclear delivery system – was lagging, underfunded and component constrained due to economic sanctions.
5. Sanctions were costing Iran tens of billions each year.
6. Iran had no access to significant overseas cash reserves.

On June 14, 2013, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. Rouhani was a former nuclear negotiator.

Three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for the resumption of negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia the United Kingdom, and the United States.

On September 27, 2013, Obama personally called Rouhani – marking the highest level contact between the U.S. and Iran since 1979.

Talks began in October 2013 in Geneva.

On November 23, 2013, Obama announced the first round of sanction relief for Iran. Congress had been pushing for further tightening of sanctions in front of negotiations.

Obama’s sanction relief was significant:

$3 billion in cash, plus another $16-17 billion [in gold, petrochemical and automotive sanction relief], totaling $20 billion in sanctions relief giving a staggering 25 percent boost to Iran’s total foreign exchange reserves.

The announcement by Obama translated to a flood of Trade Delegations visiting Iran – including ten in the first two weeks of January 2014.

Iran’s economy began to recover almost immediately. Iran’s GDP grew 3% in 2014. Inflation fell from 39% to 17%.

As the Iranian economy began growing again so did Iran’s negotiating power.

On July 14, 2015, the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany reached an agreement with Iran.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action lifted all economic sanctions and allowed Iran to access $120 billion in reserves held in banks abroad.

The JCPOA also contained a fatal flaw – Sunset Clauses:

The sunset clauses permit critical nuclear, arms, and ballistic missile restrictions to disappear over a five- to 15-year period.

Tehran must simply abide by the agreement to soon emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment program.

There was another problem.

The JCPOA’s Key Requirements noted the following:

For eight years the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place.

This assertion was repeatedly put forth by the Obama Administration. But several notable changes were made to the language on ballistic missiles.

Buried deep within the JCPOA, on page 99 (of 104 total) in Annex B (3) resides the actual language:

Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Called Upon. Designed to be Capable.

Note the crucial differences versus the original language contained within Resolution 1929:

Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

These slight variances would prove crucial.

Since the JCPOA went into effect, Iran has worked diligently to bolster its ballistic missile capabilities.

Since the conclusion of the JCPOA, Iran has launched as many as 23 ballistic missiles.

Iran has also been masking ICBM development through it’s Space Launch Program.

As noted in a letter sent by UN Ambassador Nikki Haley to the Chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee:

On July 27, 2017, Iran launched a Simorgh space launch vehicle, inconsistent with UNSCR 2231. The Simorgh is a space launch vehicle system that, if configured as a ballistic missile, would have a range of well over 300 kilometers (km) and has enough payload capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.

On August 22, 2017, Iran’s atomic chief Ali Akbar Salehi shocked the International Community by stating that Iran needs only five days to ramp its uranium enrichment back up to 20 percent.